Now is the time for a US `grand deal` with Azerbaijan - opinion

ArmInfo. The Trump administration's dealmaking blitz with Belarus has secured the release of hundreds of detainees. By trading targeted sanctions  relief for the release of political prisoners in Belarus, the White  House has helped free more than five hundred people from unjust  captivity. A similar deal with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus would  produce major rewards, with much less risk, Atlantic Council experts  believe. 

To pursue this "grand deal" in Azerbaijan, the Trump administration  should work with Congress to propose ending a ban on arms sales to  Baku in exchange for the release of unjustly detained  individuals-some with US ties-sitting in the country's jails. This is  a rare moment for a bipartisan win-win and a relatively cost-free way  to upgrade US relations with a key strategic energy and transport  partner that borders both Iran and Russia. With proper timing,  Armenia, too, could be supportive, if the release includes at least  some Armenians currently held in Azerbaijan.

What to do with Section 907

The Trump administration should engage Congress to resolve Baku's  number one concern on Capitol Hill: the repeal of Section 907 of the  FREEDOM Support Act that bans US arms sales to Azerbaijan. Congress  originally adopted the measure in 1992 to punish Azerbaijan's  treatment of Armenians in Karabakh and its blockade of Armenia. In  2001, the US Senate passed an amendment that allowed the White House  to waive Section 907 restrictions. Almost every year since, both  Republican and Democratic presidents have indeed waived Section 907.  This renders the text inconsequential to the United States, but it is  highly symbolic to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's government,  which views it as an impediment to closer relations with Washington.

Furthermore, the relationships between Washington, Baku, and Yerevan  are changing.  Armenia and Azerbaijan received unprecedented US  attention when Vice President JD Vance became the highest-level US  official to visit the countries in February, following the tripartite  leader-level summit in Washington, DC in August 2025. In Yerevan, the  vice president announced billions of dollars in nuclear energy  support, talked up a major US-funded supercomputing project, and  slipped in a tacit endorsement of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol  Pashinyan. Vance's Baku visit saw an agreement for the United States  to work with Azerbaijan in a range of areas, but no concrete  agreement.

The timing of any deal is essential, and the next few months  represent a unique opportunity. Armenia holds parliamentary elections  on June 7, and Pashinyan may face a strong test in his reelection bid  from pro-Russia parties skeptical of his efforts toward peace with  Azerbaijan. The Kremlin is conducting an extensive fake news  operation to undermine Pashinyan's campaign. Officials and experts in  Baku rightly see Pashinyan as their best chance to finally agree to a  formal peace deal and may be inclined to furtively support his  candidacy. What better way to defang Pashinyan's pro-Russia  detractors and maintain pathways to peace than to release  high-profile Armenian prisoners ahead of the election?

Additionally, Azerbaijan has found more support on the Republican  side of the aisle in the United States and may want to move on the  issue now while Congress is in GOP hands.  

That's also why, with US midterm elections just six months away, the  Trump administration may find it advantageous to push forward, as  unified Republican control potentially makes it easier for the Trump  administration to work with Congress to repeal Section 907. While  passing any legislation is a difficult task on gridlocked Capitol  Hill, Azerbaijan could offer something in exchange that both parties  and the White House would value highly: the release of prisoners that  officials, senators, and experts all consider unjustly detained. This  group should include anti-corruption advocate Gubad Ibadoghlu, Radio  Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America journalists, and some  Armenian detainees. The impact of freeing unjustly detained people  would be far more valuable to the United States than maintaining a  statute that is rendered moot almost every year. 

Such a trade would present fewer potential downsides to US interests  than recent engagement with Belarus. US Special Envoy for Belarus  John Coale has pursued a blunt sanctions-relief-for-prisoner-releases  policy, a high-risk game that some worry could make it easier for  Russia to evade US export controls and sanctions. Those fears haven't  yet been borne out, but with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr  Lukashenka still beholden to his Kremlin patron and aiding Moscow's  aggression, the United States risks undermining its own efforts to  limit Russia's ability to continue its war on Ukraine.

The stakes in Azerbaijan are thankfully much lower. The United States  would not be dropping sanctions, merely giving itself the option to  continue to provide security assistance to Baku. US military aid  today is negligible: Since 2002, the United States has delivered  approximately eighty million dollars' worth of defense assistance to  Azerbaijan in total. Vance did promise new aid on his February visit:  an unspecified number of maritime patrol boats to better secure the  country's ports. These are tiny amounts of nonlethal security  assistance made possible because the United States waives Section 907  every year. 

That figure could increase if Section 907 were repealed and  Washington and Baku began arranging multiyear security assistance  packages. Even so, that aid would likely still focus on nonlethal  border security. Azerbaijan already acquires offensive capabilities  from Turkey and Israel, at lower prices than US firms and stocks can  offer. With Iran and Russia's restive southern regions persistently  unstable, Azerbaijan needs early-warning and border security  capabilities more than it needs lethal capabilities.

The only thing the United States stands to lose by repealing Section  907 is leverage. US President Donald Trump can use that leverage by  building on his administration's success in freeing political  prisoners in Belarus to simultaneously promote peace in the South  Caucasus. Aliyev may even be more open to dealing than Lukashenka has  been.  Compared to Belarus, whose pro-democracy movement currently  functions in exile but remains a powerful diplomatic force, the  Azerbaijani government faces a much more muted opposition and could  release detainees without fearing any real threat to its authority.

How to sequence the agreement

The full "grand deal" should therefore be structured as follows. In  the run-up to the Armenian parliamentary election in June, Azerbaijan  should free some of the Armenians it captured in 2023 in Karabakh as  a gesture of good faith toward a deal. Washington and Baku then would  work to agree to repeal Section 907 in exchange for the release of  Azerbaijani detainees and additional Armenian prisoners.  This would  require the White House to work with Congress to secure the repeal  ahead of the planned release, but with renewed faith in Azerbaijan's  seriousness about the deal. 

This proposed deal has something for everyone. Baku gets a  two-for-one: It retains a true partner for peace negotiations in  Pashinyan and resolves its main issue in front of the United States.  Team Trump gets to free unjust detainees and bolster the president's  peacemaking image at essentially no cost. Congressional Republicans  get the president a foreign policy win, while Democrats can tout  their role in notching a rare human rights victory; both mollify the  ever-active Armenian diaspora by securing the release of Karabakh  Armenians. Yerevan gets citizens back and a steadier track toward  normalization with its neighbors. This arrangement must include a  clear warning to Baku that the benefits it receives are contingent on  maintaining the hard-won peace.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have made major progress in the last several  months to normalize relations, most recently boosting energy trade  ties and agreeing to joint border demarcation. With some more nudging  from the United States, Baku and Yerevan can take another step toward  a final peace deal by freeing detainees.  Crucially, all parties get  to come out with a foreign policy win at almost no cost.

This plan would test the White House's dealmaking diplomacy and  Congress's legislative creativity. But with so many potential  benefits on offer in a short window of time, it's worth exploring..

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/now-is-the-time-for-a-us-grand-deal-with- azerbaijan/?fbclid=IwY2xjawRw- rBleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFGT2Jxam53RUtVcTVjZld0c3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4O DIwMDg5MgABHl7H7tUEjvFmvHXbnEHE- S1n4yTYFAF760vfhPuhoLmo9QXqtGWJjwzqXmHd_aem_BHJ4RZyUVXdH1W_U4Qz5Qg