Paul Stronski: Yerevan’s security alliance with Moscow will not impede Armenia’s good ties with NATO

I am not going to say there is no Russian threat to the Baltics, but I generally do not believe that the Kremlin would risk a direct Russian military actionin the Baltics. Such an action would lead to a NATO response, and NATO’s military capabilities are stronger than Russia’s. 

That said, Russia has proven to be quite an unpredictable actor and often takes actions that appear to contradict its strategic interests.  Its actions in Ukraine, for example, angered the entire Ukrainian nation and turned the population further away from Russia and towards the West.  So, Russia’s actions contradicted its interests.

What I find worrying is that Russia has conducted provocative actions along the borders of NATO, using all forms of hybrid techniques, as well as some traditional military ones.  These hybrid techniques would be harder for NATO to attribute to Russia, therefore complicating NATO members’ ability to agree on an appropriate response. 

Because of these provocative actions, I expect NATO leaders to reiterate the inviolability of Article 5 at the Warsaw Summit and to work to improve NATO and member state resilience.  However, continual provocative actions on the border and incursions into NATO airspace are dangerous in themselves and heighten the risk of an unintended confrontation between a NATO member state and Russia.  This is what happened with Turkey last November.  

Do you think both NATO member states and Russia are using the threat of mutual invention as an internal political "bogeyman"?

With the exception of countries on NATO’s eastern flank, most NATO states did not view Russia as a threat until the Ukraine crisis.  Since September 11, 2001, NATO mostly focused its efforts on Afghanistan and fighting terrorism – so the bulk of NATO was not focused on Russian threats.  Russia’s actions in Ukraine – it’s annexation of Crimea and its instigation of separatism in eastern Ukraine -- heightened concerns throughout the region that Russia might intervene in its neighbors, no matter whether they are in NATO or not. So, Russian actions have given NATO a new purpose in the post-Afghanistan era, and transformed the alliance back into one that must deal with responding to Russian threats.  

Russia does not pose a direct threat to the United States, but it does pose threats to our NATO allies – especially in the Baltics, Poland and Turkey – and therefore to the alliance as a whole. These countries certainly see Russia as a threat, and are calling for a response, which explains why NATO is responding with enhanced military capabilities in the eastern NATO states.  

I do not see NATO wanting to or preparing to intervene in Russia at all.  I certainly hope the same is true with Russian intentions to the Baltic states.  But, both sides have used unhelpful rhetoric.  That raises the threat level among Russia’s neighbors.  Heightened threat levels and exclamatory rhetoric are dangerous in themselves and easily could lead to miscalculations between the two sides. So, even if state’s are using the threat for internal political purposes, it is worrying.

Please evaluate NATO's current non-interference policy towards the South Caucasus countries. What are NATO perspectives (if any) of these countries?

I don’t quite understand your question and what you mean by “non-interference policy” with the South Caucasus.  NATO views these countries as potential partners with Georgia being an aspirant for membership.  I do not see NATO membership as realistic for Georgia any time soon, however.   There is no consensus in NATO about Georgian membership and there never has been.

Armenia, as an ally of Russia, is firmly in Russia’s security orbit.  But, NATO will still continue to engage with Armenia and appreciates the partnership it has had with NATO throughout the past twenty years.  I’d also note that Armenian military reform is generally modeled after NATO and the United States, so there are clear incentives on the Armenian side to keep good ties with NATO despite Yerevan’s security alliance with Moscow. However, I do not see the relationship between NATO and Armenia getting any closer in the immediate future.

The South Caucasus is not a prime area for NATO. Threats to NATO countries generally emanate from the Middle East (terrorism) or Russia (especially in the Baltics). So, I suspect that NATO will continue to do what it has been doing for the past decade, namely exploring partnerships with all three countries.  In this light, I expect no confrontation between Russia and NATO in the South Caucasus region. I do not see NATO getting directly involved in any military action in the South Caucasus.  

What place in its relations with Russia does NATO assign to struggle against international terrorism? Does Moscow have working tools that will help to fight against this "plague of the 21st century"?

Russia and NATO have never been able to work well together on international terrorism. Mistrust between Russia and NATO states (especially the security services) is a problem because the security services and law enforcement agencies in Russia and NATO countries are key nodes in the fight against international terror. This mutual mistrust hampers information sharing that could help prevent attacks.  Furthermore, we have also seen more rogue copy-cat terrorism (like in Boston and recently in Orlando) that is harder to combat across borders than the terrorism we saw 15 years ago. The patterns of international terrorism are changing and both Russia and NATO countries seem behind the curve in figuring out how to deal with the changing nature of terrorism today.