Moscow will not succeed in returning the South Caucasus at the end of  the 80s

ArmInfo. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Arman Melikyan, in an interview with ArmInfo,  comments on the latest internal political events in Armenia and the  geopolitics around Armenia. Shares his own vision of the most likely  impulses in the South Caucasus with the participation of regional  players, and also gives some predictions about the future development  of the situation.

- Can it be noted that with the demand of the General Staff of the  Armed Forces of Armenia, the resignation of the government, the  internal political crisis in the country reached its peak. What do  you see its causes and are they exclusively internal in nature?

I do not think that the peak of the internal political crisis has  been reached. In fact, Nikol Pashinyan provoked the General Staff of  the Armed Forces of Armenia. At first, in a TV interview, he said  that the use of Iskander was ineffective, since only ten percent of  the charge detonated. When, in response to this absurd statement, the  deputy chief of the General Staff spoke critically, the latter was  immediately removed from office. This provoked a reaction from the  entire General Staff - a demand was put forward for the resignation  of the government. In response, Pashinyan sent a proposal to the  President of the country, Armen Sarkissian, about the dismissal of  the Chief of the General Staff. And here is the culmination -  Pashinyan is now trying to disown his own statement on the use of  Iskander, justifying himself by the fact that someone had reported  something to him incorrectly. That is, as it were, the issue of the  quality of this missile system is being removed, but the dismissal of  representatives of the high military command is not subject to  revision, despite the fact that Pashinyan himself admitted that he  had launched disinformation.  Now everyone has the right to believe  that this disinformation was deliberately launched in order to  provoke the military, which was quite successful. The question is why  did Pashinyan need it?

- Concern about the possibility of a military coup in Armenia has  already been expressed by the Foreign Minister and the President of  Turkey. Cavusoglu and Erdogan emphasized the unacceptability of such  a scenario. Where, in your opinion, does this concern for the  government of a country with which Turkey does not even have  diplomatic relations come from?

It is important for official Ankara that the internal political  crisis in Armenia lasts as long as possible.  Prime Minister Nikol  Pashinyan is the core of this internal political crisis and the  generator of ongoing internal instability. Accordingly, for this  reason, the political support provided to him from Turkey is well  within the framework of the approaches developed and applied by  Turkey towards Armenia.

- All confrontation between the authorities and the opposition in  Armenia comes down to mutual insults and accusations of past deeds.  Both of them keep silent about their plans, vision regarding the  future of the country, moreover, specific programs by and large. Two  and a half years are left before the elections, not to mention the  prospect of early elections still hanging in the air, but Armenian  politicians continue to evade even promises of a better future. Don't  you think this is strange?

Unfortunately, neither the Pashinyan government nor the 17+ group is  capable of proposing a positive program of action for the future. Not  a single rational, positive action is proposed, and this only  testifies to their complete political and moral inconsistency.

- The Speaker of Parliament and the President of Iran announced their  country's intention to become a member of the EAEU. Is the emergence  of such a desire one of the results of the 44-day bloodshed in  Artsakh and what, in your opinion, is Tehran's motivation for making  such a decision?

I do not have a definite answer to this question. I do not exclude  that official Tehran, anticipating a further complication of the  military-political situation at its borders, is trying to somehow  hedge itself by creating new schemes of regional interaction.  Apparently, in this way, Iran hopes, first of all, to bypass the  sanctions imposed against them thanks to membership in a large  interstate economic and transport organization.

- Judging by the content of the trilateral statements of November 9,  2020 and January 11, 2021, Russia is focusing on unblocking  communications in achieving long-term peace in the region, subject to  its own interests. Does the prospect of opening the  Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan-Turkey corridor correspond to Moscow's  interests? And is not the involvement of Georgia in the communication  projects of the Russian Federation, and such signs are already being  observed, a necessary condition for Moscow to return the South  Caucasus to the conditional 1988 year?

Moscow, of course, can consider such plans, but I think their  implementation is unlikely. In the South Caucasus, the former Russian  influence has already been replaced by Turkish military, political  and economic influence. And according to my forecasts, it is unlikely  that Russia will be able to return the situation by the end of the  80s.

- Do you consider the military phase of the redistribution of our  region and the formation of a new status quo completed? Or, in the  foreseeable future, new explosions may follow, and the 44-day war in  this sense was just a trigger that opened the "Pandora's box" in the  Caucasus?

I believe that our region has not yet gone through a phase of high  military turbulence. And in this light, outbreaks of military  violence may still repeat more than once or twice. Accordingly,  Armenia needs to overcome the internal political crisis as soon as  possible and form a new government. Unfortunately, the development of  the internal political situation in our country at this stage does  not inspire much optimism.